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IN NOVEMBER 2013, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a proposed rule for 
the 2014 biofuel mandates. The proposal 
was met with strong opposition from 
ethanol supporters but with much relief 
by the oil industry. This article explains 
how this rule came about and possible 
courses of action for EPA.
Congress ϐirst established the 
Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) in the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005. The ϐirst 
RFS were relatively modest and the 
market quickly surpassed the mandated 
volumes. The RFS were revised two 
years later with the enactment of the 
Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007. The second iteration of biofuel 
mandates, RFS2, required an annual 
biofuel use of 36 billion gallons by 2022, 
with a cap on corn-starch ethanol of 15 
billion gallons. Mandates for different 
categories of biofuel were set to 
increase annually.
EPA has approved three ethanol-
gasoline fuels for general motorist 
use: E10, which contains 10 percent 
ethanol, E15, which contains 15 
percent ethanol, and E85, which 
contains up to 83 percent ethanol. E10 
is available in virtually all fuel stations 
while E15 and E85 are available in 
a small number of fuel stations. In 
late 2012 and early 2013, it became 
apparent that scheduled increases in 
ethanol consumption mandates would 
require increasing use of ethanol-
gasoline blends that contain more 
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than 10 percent ethanol. With an 
expected E10 consumption for 
2014 of about 130 billion gallons, 
13 billion gallons of ethanol 
can be blended into gasoline, 
far short of the scheduled 14.4 
billion gallons mandated for 
2014. Many refer to the 13 billion 
gallon consumption of ethanol 
as the E10 “blend wall” because of 
the perceived difϐiculty in expanding 
consumption beyond this volume. 
Obligated parties, such as oil 
reϐineries, must show compliance with 
the ethanol mandate by submitting 
Renewable Identiϐication Numbers 
(RINs). EPA established a RIN market 
to reduce compliance costs. The price 
of RINs reϐlects the difference between 
the cost of producing ethanol and the 
value to ethanol buyers of one more 
gallon of ethanol. Therefore, the price of 
RINs reϐlects how difϐicult it is to meet 
the ethanol mandate. EPA rules allow 
banking of RINs so that accumulated RINs 
can be used for compliance. The ethanol 
mandate for 2013 of 13.8 billion gallons 
will be met by approximately 13 billion 
gallons of actual ethanol consumption 
and by using 800 million banked RINs. 
The stock of RINs is no longer sufϐicient 
to meet scheduled mandate increases 
with ethanol consumption limited to 13 
billion gallons. Accordingly, RIN prices 
increased dramatically in January 2013, 
indicating that it would be very costly 
for obligated parties to meet the 2014 
ethanol mandate. 
U.S. ethanol policy made RINs an 
input in the production of gasoline. With 
a non-binding ethanol mandate, the price 
of RINs is zero, which does not increase 
costs to oil reϐineries. However, with an 
ethanol mandate in excess of the blend 
wall, the price of RINs is greater than 
zero, thus increasing oil reϐineries costs. 
Typically, when the price of an input 
increases, ϐirms adjust and modify their 
practices to minimize the impact on 
proϐits of higher procurement costs. For 
the oil industry, knowing that they would 
eventually face an increase in the price of 
RINs, the most likely pathway to minimize 
costs of compliance was to develop an 
alternative distribution channel for 
ethanol volumes above the blend wall—
currently, E85 appears to be the most 
likely channel for ethanol volumes beyond 
the blend wall. An increase in the supply 
of E85 would increase the demand for 
ethanol thus reducing the price of RINs. 
E85 is currently distributed in about 
2,600 of the 115,000 fuel stations in the 
United States. 
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Since 1941, Iowa State University has conducted an annual land value survey intended to analyze, interpret, and disseminate information about farmland value trends 
throughout the state of Iowa. Individuals knowledgeable of 
market conditions, such as real estate brokers and economists, 
are asked to contribute price estimates for high, medium, and 
low value land in their counties, and, if applicable, surrounding 
counties. Survey administrators also analyze comparative sale 
values and other factors in developing an estimate of farmland 
values. While the survey does not provide an estimated value 
of any one piece of land, it does provide an overview of price 
trends for farmland on a state and county level.
In 1986, ISU professor and extension economist Mike Duffy 
took over as the head administrator of the Iowa Farmland 
Values Survey. However, when Dr. Duffy announced his 
retirement from ISU extension, the staff and faculty at 
CARD were granted the opportunity to administer this highly 
anticipated annual survey. 
Historical Data
While one number—the average Iowa farmland acre value 
(estimated at $8,716 per acre in 2013)—typically garners the 
most attention, the survey actually provides a much more 
complex view of farmland values. The survey estimates an 
average overall value for farmland in each of Iowa’s 99 counties, 
and a low, medium, high, and average value for land in each 
crop-reporting district, and the state as a whole.
The entire set of historical data including the years 1950–
2013 is available on the ISU extension web site at http://bit.
ly/1csmLz8. The following fi gure shows the weighted average 







THE IOWA State University land value survey reported an average increase of 5.1 percent 
in Iowa farmland values—the ninth time 
in the past 10 years land values have 
increased. The statewide average value 
of an acre of farmland is now estimated 
to be $8,716. Scott County in eastern 
Iowa saw the largest estimated increase 
over last year’s value at 12.45 percent, 
the highest increase in value at $1,374, 
and now has the highest estimated total 
value per acre at $12,413. 
Despite the average value 
increasing again, 2013 marked the 
second time in the past 10 years where 
some counties reported lower land 
values than the previous year. In 2009, 
85 of Iowa’s 99 counties reported lower 
values than the year before, and this 
year 14 counties reported lower land 
values than in 2012. This year, Osceola, 
Dickinson, Lyon, and O’Brien counties 
showed the largest average loss of 
value at 3.72 percent. Except for 2009 
and 2013, all county land values have 
increased each year since 2004.
Interestingly, the 2013 survey 
reveals a shift that occurred in certain 
regions of the state. From 2010–2012 
O’Brien County reported the highest 
land values in the state. However, in 
2013, Scott County reported the highest 
increase in land values and the highest 
land values overall, while land values 
in O’Brien County actually dropped the 
most of all counties reporting lower 
values. It is interesting to note that 
from 1950–1973 and 1978–2009 Scott 
County had the highest land values in 
the state. 
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The slowing, or even reversal, 
of the rate of increase in land values 
is supported by data from other 
surveys. The Realtors Land Institute 
reported land values up 9.4 percent 
from September 2012 to March 2013 
but only up 1.2 percent from March 
2013 to September 2013. The Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago reported Iowa 
land values up 9 percent from October 
2012 to October 2013, however, the 
same survey reported Iowa land values 
decreased by 1 percent from July to 
October 2013.
Outlook for land values
Strong and weak price sales occurring at 
the same time indicate a market in ϐlux. 
The key question is if this shows the 
market is going to settle into a plateau, 
if it is just pausing before another 
takeoff in values, or if the market has 
peaked and is due for a correction. The 
odds are against a major collapse in 
land values; however, if projections of a 
new lower level for commodity prices 
hold then we should expect land values 
to drop accordingly. 
There have been three ‘golden’ 
eras for Iowa land values over the past 
100 years. The ϐirst ended in a long, 
drawn out decline in land values from 
1921 to 1933, and the second golden 
era ended with a sudden collapse from 
1981 to 1986. How this third golden 
era will end is not known, but it would 
appear that it will be a more orderly 
adjustment rather than a sudden 
collapse.
Currently, with respect to Iowa 
land values, one respondent described 
the situation as being a plateau. He 
based this comment on the observation 
that there had been some very strong 
sales in his area but there had also 
been some weak or no sales at recent 
auctions—a sentiment echoed by many 
of the respondents.
Market-infl uencing factors
Most survey respondents, 88 percent, 
listed positive and/or negative factors 
inϐluencing the land market. Of these 
respondents, almost 83 percent listed at 
least one positive factor and 77 percent 
listed at least one negative factor. 
The single biggest factor to assess 
land value movement is gross farm 
income, and a majority of survey 
respondents were concerned about 
income. Over three-fourths, 76 percent, 
of respondents cited lower commodity 
prices as a negative factor affecting land 
markets. Data show the rate of increase 
in land values slowed and commodity 
prices started dropping after June 2013.
In Iowa, corn and soybean price 
movements are good indicators of gross 
farm income movement. There was a 33 
percent drop in the Iowa average corn 
price from October 2012 to October 
2013, and there was an 11 percent 
drop in soybean prices over the same 
period. The November estimated price 
for Iowa corn was 39 percent lower than 
the November 2012 price, and soybean 
prices were 11 percent lower.
Commodity prices dropped this 
year, something that also occurred in 
2009. Will commodity prices rebound 
as they did in 2010 or will they continue 
down? The answer to that question 
could provide insight into whether 
future land prices will rise or fall. 
Average Value per Acre of Iowa Farmland by Grades of Land
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WITH THE general economy posting some positive numbers now, consumer demand continues to rebuild out of the depths of the past recession. The general 
demand trend across agriculture is positive, moving right along with 
other consumer demands. If there is a weak spot in agricultural 
demand right now, it is at the wholesale level for livestock. Record 
high prices and limited supplies have pinched packer demand for 
meat animals, as packers are concerned about the ability to continue 
to pass along higher prices to consumers. For crops, given the ample 
supplies that emerged last fall, the strength in crop demand has 
helped moderate prices over the past several months—basically 
holding crop prices around break even levels.
For livestock and meat demand, we will concentrate on the last 
quarter of 2013. Over the past decade-and-a-half, 4th quarter cattle 
demand from meat packers has been a see-saw affair. The big drop 
in demand occurred with the 2008–2009 recession. There was 
a strong rebound in packer demand in 2010 and 2011, but that 
demand has backed off again in the past two years. Packer demand 
for cattle in the 4th quarter of 2013 was slightly below the previous 
year’s levels. With fed cattle prices at or near record levels, there is 
a lot of concern in the beef industry about pushing beef prices too 
high at the retail counter. That concern shows up as lower packer 
demand for cattle.
For hogs, the general trend has been for more demand from 
the packers. However, as with cattle, 4th quarter demand for hogs 
from the packing industry has been lower over the past couple of 
years, with 2011 being the high water mark for packer demand 
in the hog industry. Since then, the same concerns over retail 
meat prices have limited packer movements, so 2014 will be an 
interesting and challenging year in the meat packing industry with 
both cattle and hog prices in record territory.
While packers are concerned about the willingness of 
consumers to accept higher meat prices at the retail counter, the 
data from last quarter show that consumers have, for the most 
part, been willing to pay those higher prices. Retail beef demand in 
the 4th quarter has risen the last four years in a row, approaching 
the levels of demand from 2004. In fact, the last four years in beef 
demand is highly similar to a surge that occurred between 2000 
and 2004; and with beef production expected to decline by roughly 
ϐive percent this year, consumer willingness to accept higher beef 
prices will be challenged again.
Compared to the swings in retail beef demand since 2000, 
retail pork demand in the 4th quarter has been relatively steady. 
Pork demand also took a hit during the recession, but has since 
rebounded and is now above pre-recession levels. Last year’s 
Retail Meat and Crop Demand Continue to Grow
by Chad Hart and Lee Schulz
chart@iastate.edu; lschulz@iastate.edu
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bounce in pork demand was the largest since 2010. While 
retail pork prices have risen, the rise in retail beef prices has 
helped the pork industry. That competitive advantage at the 
meat case has led to more pork demand. Looking forward, while 
pork prices are at record highs, pork production is expected to 
increase by one percent this year. That should alleviate some of 
the price pressure for pork at the meat case.
The demand picture for livestock and meat remains mixed. 
Packers are concerned about consumer acceptance of higher 
meat prices, but so far, consumers have been willing to buy meat 
at those higher prices. In general, meat supplies are projected 
to remain steady as lower beef production is offset by higher 
pork and poultry production. Record high livestock prices have 
created proϐit incentives in the livestock industry, and producers 
are beginning to ramp up production and chase after those 
proϐits. Given its longer production cycle, the beef industry will 
be the last to begin expansion.
For the crop sector, the marketing year does not line up 
with the calendar year. The months September to November 
represent the 1st quarter of the marketing year. Probably the 
best way to think about a crop-marketing year is to pretend 
the crop harvest is like New Year’s, a new crop means a new 
marketing year. The crop markets entered the 2013/14 
marketing year with supplies at or near record levels. The 
2013 U.S. corn crop was the largest ever, while the 2013 U.S. 
soybean crop was within 100 million bushels of the record. 
Therefore, the big question was how quickly crop demands 
would respond to larger supplies and lower prices. The answer 
thus far has been “fairly quickly.” For corn, demand has a very 
strong seasonal pattern due to livestock feeding. Given the 
limited grazing opportunities in the fall and winter months, 
corn utilization for livestock feed is the highest in the 1st and 2nd 
quarters of the marketing year. For the 1st quarter this marketing 
year, corn feed demand pulled an additional 400 million bushels 
over last year’s levels. With ethanol and export demand also on 
the upswing, corn usage so far is running 15.5 percent ahead 
of last year’s pace. Therefore, corn demand is strengthening as 
we enter 2014. USDA’s projections show that strengthening will 
continue as we move through the year.
 Soybean demand follows a similar pattern to corn, again 
based on livestock feed requirements. However, soybean 
export demand also is seasonal, and that ampliϐies the impact 
for soybeans. The reasoning behind the seasonal pattern to 
soybean exports is the seasonal pattern of worldwide soybean 
production. The vast majority of global corn supplies 
are produced in the northern hemisphere, meaning that 
there is only one huge shot of supply each year. Global 
soybean supplies come in two waves, one from the 
northern hemisphere (United States) and one from the 
southern hemisphere (Brazil and Argentina). Due to the 
second round of supply each year, export demands tend 
to shift between the hemispheres after each harvest. 
The United States dominates exports from our harvest 
to the South American harvest and Brazil and Argentina 
dominate exports from their harvest to ours. So far this 
marketing year, the United States has seen both domestic 
and international demand for soybeans increase. Crop 
demands are back on the rise. The problem for the crop 
markets are that these demand increases are just enough 
to hold prices steady, not enough to bring prices back to 
higher levels. 
6 / Agricultural Policy Review
KNOWING WHEN to forward contract is one of the most difϐicult aspects of grain 
marketing. If futures and forward markets 
worked perfectly, then this decision would 
not matter over the long run. Futures and 
forward contracts for harvest delivery 
should all be efϐicient predictors of the 
price at harvest and there should be no 
obvious trend in proϐitability of hedging 
across various months prior to harvest; 
however, as will be shown below, actual 
data for the last 20 years shows a modest 
but economically important pattern. 
Here I describe the trend and provide a 
suggestion as to why it exists. 
Figures 1 and 2 below simulate 
the actual performance of hypothetical 
forward contracts for each of 24 months 
prior to harvest. The data show the 
average price that would have been 
received by producers who contracted 
to deliver harvested grain in each of the 
24 months prior to that year’s harvest. 
The larger the value, the better off was 
the producer who routinely contracted 
to deliver that many months prior to 
each year’s harvest. 
The ϐigures are based on data from 
1993–2013 and assume a constant basis 
between the delivery location and the CME. 
Is there an Optimal Month to Forward Contract?
by Dermot Hayes
dhayes@iastate.edu
 The data for corn in Figure 1 shows 
a distinct downward trend indicating 
that those who forward contracted 
24 months prior to harvest obtained 
a price $0.30 per bushel (about 10 
percent) greater than those who sold in 
November of the harvest year. The data 
for soybeans also shows a $0.30 per 
bushel difference between the 24 month 
out forward contract and cash sales in 
October of the harvest year. Soybean 
data, however, indicates that the very 
worst time to sign a forward contract is 
12 months prior to harvest. 
These patterns could well be driven 
by random noise. It is possible that if 
this experiment was repeated for the 
next 100 years, these trends would 
disappear. However, it is also possible 
that there is something else going on. 
There is a well-known 
phenomenon in grain futures markets 
called the “weather premium.” These 
markets typically over predict the 
actual harvest futures price in more 
years than they under predict. The 
logic is that the magnitude of upside 
price movements in the event of bad 
weather is greater than the downside 
price movement in years when 
weather is good. Futures market 
builds in a premium to account for 
this asymmetry up to the point in the 
growing season where the weather is 
no longer a major determinant of yield. 
New crop futures typically fall in July as 
the weather premium dissipates.  
What should happen is a price 
increase in bad weather, such as 
in 1995 and 2010, large enough to 
compensate for several more modest 
price reductions in good weather 
years. This does not appear to have 
happened. It is possible that futures 
market participants expected more 
bad years than were actually observed 
or that the upside price increases in 
bad years was not as large as they 
expected. Of course, it is also true 
that the 20 years of data used here 
is simply not long enough to contain 
a complete distribution of weather 
patterns. 
The two-year trend in corn 
data may simply reϐlect the gradual 
dissipation of two years of weather 
premium. The twelve-month pattern 
in the soybean data may reϐlect the 
importance of the South American 
soybean crop and the dissipation of the 
weather premium due to uncertainty 
about this crop. 
Figure 1. Average Corn Price Received on Forward 
Contracts Signed in Each of 24 Months Prior to Harvest
Figure 2. Average Soybean Price Received on Forward 
Contracts Signed in Each of 24 Months Prior to Harvest
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continued on page 9
PROTECTIONISM IN agricultural trade takes many forms from taxes and red tape at the border, 
to so-called non-tariff measures such as 
agricultural and food safety standards 
that exceed those recommended by 
international public health bodies. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
does not set standards but strongly 
encourages member countries to use 
internationally accepted science-based 
standards whenever available. The 
WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement promotes harmonization of 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
and alignment on international 
standards, in short, they encourage 
countries to use the same standards as 
one another in setting their country’s 
trade regulation to keep trade 
opportunities fair. The SPS agreement 
designates Codex Alimentarius, a joint 
body of the World Health Organization 
and the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization, as the 
organization deϐining standards for food 
safety. The WTO allows its members 
to vary from the Codex standards for 
a product, as long as the standards in 
its place are science based (evidence of 
a risk from the regulated substance), 
non-discriminatory (similar products of 
all origins treated similarly), and least-
trade restrictive (no unnecessary trade 
impediments). Thus, a country that does 
not use the Codex standard to regulate 
its trade does not necessarily indicate 
protectionist motives, but the Codex 
standard provides an important baseline 
for assessing protectionist outcomes. 
This article reports on recent 
research completed on the potential 
protectionist effects of maximum 
residue limits (MRLs) for pesticides 
(and a few veterinary drugs) 
established by individual countries 
in global agricultural and food trade. 
Countries set the MRL for speciϐic 
pesticides or drugs and for speciϐic 
agricultural and food items. Countries 
also deϐine a set of default values 
which are used for pesticides or drugs 
that are not explicitly regulated as 
regulation trails behind new pesticide 
and drugs.
To provide insight into the 
potential for protectionist effects of 
the MRL standards set by countries, 
we designed and computed 
aggregated indices of protectionism 
for these MRLs based on the percent 
deviation of a country’s MRL from 
the Codex standard. The indices 
allow for aggregation over MRLs and 
commodities and comparison across 
agricultural products and countries. 
One important property of these 
measures is that the indices increase 
more than proportionally with 
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Ethanol Mandates Compliance Strategy
continued from page 1
The strategy outlined above was 
not the one that the oil industry chose. 
Instead, the oil industry made the 
argument that ethanol mandates would 
impose a substantial burden and pushed 
EPA to lower ethanol mandates to keep 
the price of RINs low. With limited 
distribution of E85, any economic 
analysis of the ethanol market would 
show an increase in RIN prices for an 
increase in ethanol mandate above 
13 billion gallons. Many pundits and 
the lobby of the oil industry predicted 
dire consequence to the U.S. economy 
unless ethanol mandates were scaled 
back below the blend wall. The lack of 
adaptation to ethanol mandates causes 
high RIN prices and thus solidiϐies the 
argument that ethanol imposes a large 
ϐinancial burden to the oil industry. 
However, the size of the increase in RIN 
prices has been conditioned by limited 
increase in the supply of E85.
The EPA lowered its 2014 
mandate to 13 billion gallons based 
on consideration of the oil industry’s 
claims. EPA noted in justifying its 
rule that it cannot increase ethanol 
mandates as long the capacity to 
distribute ethanol through E85 is not 
expanded. 
However, the issue here is 
analogous to the chicken and the egg. 
Obligated parties can contribute to 
lower the price of RINs by increasing 
their capacity to distribute ethanol. 
Thus the price of RINs provide the 
appropriate incentives for increasing 
capacity to distribute ethanol. However,   
if RIN prices are low, there is no 
incentive to invest. 
The best course of action for 
EPA is to make is a strong long-term 
commitment either to increase or freeze 
the ethanol mandate. If it is the goal 
of the EPA to expand ethanol volumes 
in the future, removing uncertainty 
is key to spurring investment in the 
distribution of ethanol, and thus in 
reducing compliance costs to obligated 
parties. A similar argument holds if EPA 
decides to freeze ethanol mandates. 
A pause in 2014 and then resetting 
course in 2015 would only cause ϐirms 
to waste money, create uncertainty, and 
undermine the credibility of EPA.
It is a natural position for the oil 
industry to oppose biofuel mandates 
that increase their costs; and the 
proposed rule for 2014 shows that the 
oil industry has played its hand well in 
an effort to stop expansion of ethanol 
mandates. EPA has now received 
comments on the proposed rule and 
is set to release a ϐinal rule by this 
summer, which should set the course of 
U.S. ethanol policy for years to come. 
Catherine Kling, Director of the 
Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development, Iowa State University, 
and other leaders in economics 
and environmental issues are 
interviewed in this CenUSA video, 
“Enhancing The Mississippi 
River Watershed with Perennial 
Bioenergy Crops.” The video 
focuses on the role perennial grass 
energy crops can play in improving 
water qualtiy. Compared to row 
crops, perennial grasses have been 
shown to reduce runoff, erosion and 
nutrients by as much as 90 percent.
http://vimeo.com/84352256
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Protectionism of Food Safety Standards
continued from page 7
increasing protectionism in MRLs to 
reϐlect the increasing difϐiculty to meet 
more stringent standards.
For pairs of chemicals and 
agricultural products for which a Codex 
standard exists and a country’s MRL 
for that particular pair is set to be 
more stringent than the corresponding 
international standard, the index 
indicates protectionism (a value above 
1). Vice versa, lax standards are anti-
protectionist and the index value then 
falls below 1. The research did not 
consider MRLs for which Codex does 
not set an international standard, as the 
science is being established or risk may 
not exist.
The data used come from USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Service. The 
database used values for 2012 and had 
19,486 pairs of pesticides and products 
for 83 countries with a total of over 
1.6 million records. The pesticide MRL 
data swamps the veterinary drug MRLs 
in coverage with only about 9,000 
veterinary drug records. In the analysis, 
the database is trimmed to about 
400,000 usable observations for 77 
countries by removing redundant data 
and observations without corresponding 
Codex standards. Here, we focus on 
pesticides as they drive results when 
using both pesticide and veterinary drug 
MRLs. We also limit the discussion to 
country level protectionism indices and 
refer the interested readers to our detail 
report for commodity level results.
Among the countries included 
in the data, 29 countries completely 
comply with Codex standards; 18 
countries comply with EU standards; 7 
countries defer to exporting countries 
standards; 5 countries comply with 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
standards; and Mexico adopted U.S. 
standards. Finally, 22 countries set 
their own standards only or have 
standards partially combined with 
Codex or EU standards.
The table summarizes results on 
each country’s protectionist indices. 
Australia, Japan, and Taiwan come out 
as the most protectionist countries. 
This is largely due to the fact that they 
have stringent default values for MRLs 
that they do not explicitly set (zero or 
near-zero tolerance when an MRL is 
not explicitly speciϐied) and because 
they have many non-established MRLs. 
In addition, Australia and Taiwan 
have stringent established MRLs. In 
contrast, Japan actually is slightly 
anti-protectionist (the index is below 
1) when computing the index solely 
using established MRLs. Russia and 
Brazil come out as systematically 
protectionist because of stringency 
on established MRLs but much less 
because of default MRLs which are 
lax. They have a large number of non-
established MRLs, which dilute the 
presence of the limited number of 
established MRLs and their associated 
protectionism.
The EU, Turkey, and Canada are 
also among protectionist countries 
because they have both tight default 
and established MRLs that are 
stricter than Codex. Interestingly, 
a few countries, including South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, and Albania have 
MRLs set much below Codex MRLs 
with the consequence of potentially 
under-protecting the health of their 
consumers from harmful residues.
None of these two measures 
provides a better measure of 
protectionism than the other. Rather 
they both shed light on two ways to 
be protectionist, one by actively over-
regulating speciϐic pesticides, and the 
other with a blanket policy that could be 
relaxed once a speciϐic MRL is issued for 
a formerly unregulated pesticide. 
The standard deviations of the 
indices  tend to be small (this data can 
be found in the full paper cited below.) 
The research did not unveil evidence 
of countries being non-protectionist 
“on average” by offsetting a few very 
protectionist MRLs or markets with 
anti-protectionist ones. This ϐinding 
is consistent with the observed small 
standard deviations across products 
within any country.
For further information and detail 
on the inquiry see Li, Yuan, and John 
C. Beghin “Protectionism Indices for 
Non-Tariff Measures: An Application to 
Maximum Residue Levels,” Economics 
department working paper No. 12013, 
2012. Forthcoming in Food Policy.  
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      o you have a question for 
an Agricultural Economist?
The “Ask an Ag Economist” 
segment is where we invite 
readers to submit questions 
to us. We will periodically 
choose questions of general 
interest to respond to in 
future issues.
Questions can be submitted 





Farmland prices are setting records. Do economists know how 
much of this strong price appreciation is due to government 
policy such as ethanol mandates, subsidized crop insurance, 
direct payments, etc.?
THE WAY ECONOMISTS typically 
explain movements in farmland prices 
uses the “net present value method.” 
This method sums up the “discounted 
expected future earnings” from farmland 
and arrives at an estimate of what 
farmland is worth today. Discounting is 
the method used to adjust for inϐlation, 
because $10,000 paid out in ϐive years 
has less value than $10,000 paid out 
today. Thus, the two key factors that 
determine land prices are expected 
future earnings and the rate at which 
futures earnings are discounted.
The Great Recession that hit the U.S. 
economy in 2009 led the Federal Reserve 
to stimulate the economy by lowering 
interest rates. The lower interest rates 
dramatically reduced the amount 
of interest that can be earned. This 
decrease in interest earned narrows the 
gap between the value of $10,000 in ϐive 
years and the value of $10,000 today. 
Thus, the action by the Federal Reserve 
dramatically lowered the discount rate 
that is used to value farmland.
To see the effects of a lower discount 
rate, the net present value of $250 
earnings per acre into the future with 
a discount rate of 6 percent is $4,166. 
The net present value of the same 
earnings with a 3 percent discount 
rate is $8,333. This demonstrates that 
the low interest rate environment 
we are in has dramatically increased 
farmland prices.
Direct payments and crop insurance 
subsidies have each averaged about 
$40 per acre. The net present value of 
$40 per acre each year into the future 
is $666 using a 6 percent discount rate 
and $1,333 using a 3 percent discount 
rate, showing these two subsidies 
account for some fraction of land values. 
However, because farm subsidies have 
always been available, they did not 
contribute to the increase in land prices 
that we have seen in the last 10 years.
The growth in ethanol production has 
certainly contributed to land price 
increases because increased demand for 
corn has led to increased corn prices. If 
we attribute an $80 per acre increase 
in expected futures earnings from land 
because of ethanol  then increased 
ethanol production contributed $2,000 
per acre to the increase in land prices 
since 2005 if we use a 4 percent 
discount rate.
The average price of farmland in Iowa 
increased by almost $6,000 between 
2005 and 2013, according to the Iowa 
Land Value Survey. While it is not 
possible to state precisely how much 
of this increase was due to increased 
earnings and how much was due to 
lower interest rates, it is clear that both 
have contributed signiϐicantly. One might 
not be too far wrong in attributing 50 
percent of the increase in land values to 
lower interest rates and 50 percent to 
higher expected earnings. 
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● Energy and Biofuels Policy: renewable 
fuels standard, indirect land use, 
effects on food prices and trade, 
willingness to pay for bioplastics, 
perennial feedstocks
● Trade Policy: beneϐits of the Trans-
Paciϐic Partnership, free trade 
agreements with South Korea, 
Columbia, and Panama, US-China 
trade in pork, EU-US free trade 
agreement (feedstock crops and 
bioenergy) trade barriers and quality 
standards, trade consequences of 
sustainability requirements, country 
of origin labeling,
● Agriculture and the Environment:  
Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy, 
agriculture and Gulf of Mexico 
hypoxia, grassland conversion and 
CRP losses, beneϐits of local water 
quality improvement, 
● Food Security: USDA projections for 
countries at risk, food security in 
Ghana (with seed center), 
● Nutrition: nutritional standards for 
national school lunch programs, 
global burden of foodborne diseases, 
● Crop Insurance: Multi-year crop 
insurance, margin insurance for corn 
and soybeans,
● Crop yields: improved yield 
prediction, climate change and yields, 
predicting effects of GM crops on 
yields.
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